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Abstract
The current research examines social psychologists’ beliefs regarding the probability
of self and others to engage in desirable and undesirable actions relevant to solving
dilemmas of academic practice (e.g. openly discussing versus concealing complex
effects in a paper). Consistent with hypotheses, results revealed that social
psychologists believed that others are more likely than they themselves to engage
in undesirable actions and less likely to engage in academically desirable actions.
Moreover, the probability of undesirable actions by both self and others was
perceived to be greater under conditions of low rather than high perceived
traceability (i.e. when others within the field are believed not to verify the
appropriateness of the actions). Interestingly, but unexpectedly, this latter result
was observed among faculty members but not among individuals with less research
experience (i.e. graduate students). The discussion considers possible explanations
for this latter finding and closes with an implication relevant to the peer review
system. # 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
Every now and then, the enterprise of publishing about scientific research involves
dilemmas. For example, should one describe very complex effects in a paper,
seemingly uninteresting effects that may further complicate the message one wants
to bring across? To what extent could one mimic excellent sentences produced by
others, and how explicitly should one cite these sentences? Indeed, the accumulation
of knowledge through scientific research is, to some extent, guided by norms
regarding academically desirable and academically undesirable actions. Such norms
include accuracy, replicability, and novelty of the contributions to the literature,
and presumably are developed to serve the collective interest of a scientific
discipline— the accumulation of knowledge.
The current research examines social psychologists’ beliefs regarding the
probability for self and others to engage in desirable and undesirable actions
relevant to solving dilemmas of academic practice. Using insights derived from
literatures regarding self–other judgement and social comparison, we attempt to
understand: (a) how beliefs regarding the actions of other social psychologists relate
to beliefs regarding one’s own actions within dilemmas of academic practice, and (b)
whether the rated probability of desirable and undesirable actions is influenced by
perceived traceability, or the probability that others within the field will verify the
appropriateness of these actions.
Do We Think We Are Better Than—and Not as Bad as—Our Fellow Social
Psychologists?
One pervasive social-cognitive tendency of people involves self enhancement, the
tendency to process social information in ways so as to maintain or improve a
favourable evaluation of the self. Such tendencies may partially account for self-
enhancing interpretations of success and failure experiences (e.g. Miller & Ross, 1975;
Zuckerman, 1979) and for the belief in a multifaceted self, ascribing a greater number
of traits to self than to others (cf. Sande, Goethals, & Radloff, 1988). Self-
enhancement may also be revealed by tendencies to self–other asymmetries in social
comparison, which suggest that individuals tend to differentiate themselves from
others when the comparison itself is potentially threatening to one’s feelings of
uniqueness (Codol, 1975; see also Hoorens, 1993). The notion of self-enhancement is
perhaps most directly supported in research on perceptions of superiority, revealing
that individuals believe that they are distinctly better than—and not as bad as—
others. For example, people perceive themselves as more generous and honest, and
less deceitful or selfish than they perceive most others or the average other (e.g.
Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; Van Lange, 1991).
Tendencies toward perceived superiority have been explained by the motivation to
enhance or protect self-esteem along with the manner in which information about self
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and others is processed. For example, individuals may to some extent filter positive
information about the self and reinterpret information that is not self-enhancing (cf.
Taylor & Brown, 1988). Also, tendencies toward self-enhancement and perceived
superiority are facilitated by (a) downward comparison, or selectively focusing on
‘inferior’ others (cf. Wills, 1991), and (b) dimensional comparison, or selectively
focusing on attributes that makes one’s self appear superior (cf. Wood, 1989).
Frequently, perceptions of superiority are described as ‘illusions’ or ‘biases’
because it seems logically impossible for all or most of us to be better than average1
(cf. Messick et al., 1985; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Accordingly, ‘social psychologists-
as-observers’ tend to understand perceptions of superiority by attributing illusory,
self-enhancing beliefs to ‘the actors’ who participate in our studies. But, do social
psychologists, too, think they are better than—and not as bad as—other social
psychologists? Do we, too, hold what have been described as illusory, self-enhancing
beliefs about ourselves? If so, such evidence would support the notion that self-
enhancing tendencies exist among individuals who presumably are aware of
superiority effects (and to some degree have informed others about such effects),
thereby contributing to the generality of this effect. Accordingly, we predicted that
social psychologists would exhibit both positive superiority, believing that they are
more likely than others to engage in academically desirable actions, and negative
superiority, believing that they are less likely than others to engage in academically
undesirable actions (hypothesis 1).
What Are Our Beliefs of the Academic Practices Followed by Social Psychologists?
Do social psychologists believe that we and our colleagues are tempted to engage in
somewhat undesirable actions, if we know that others could or would not verify the
appropriateness of such actions? We propose that social psychologists believe that
academically undesirable actions are more likely—and academically desirable
actions are less likely— to the extent that the appropriateness of such actions is
perceived to be less traceable (i.e. when others within the field are expected not to
verify whether actions are academically appropriate). This proposition is based on
the assumption that individuals hold implicit theories stating that open, public
situations may facilitate collectively desirable actions, whereas closed, anonymous
situations may give rise to collectively undesirable actions. This implicit theory
should be held especially by social psychologists who have further reasoned that
public situations allow for normative influences which may bring about social
benefits or social costs (i.e. approval versus disapproval by others), whereas
anonymous situations do so to a lesser extent or not at all (cf. Rettig & Pasamanick,
1964; Tetlock, 1992). Accordingly, we predicted that academically undesirable
actions would be viewed as more likely under conditions of low-traceability rather
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1Whether the ‘better-than-average’ phenomenon actually is an illusion is less relevant that the mere fact
that social psychologists have described such effects in terms of illusions or biased, distorted perceptions.
Also, the theorists that have advanced this argument have also acknowledged that for skewed distributions
it is logically possible for a majority to be better than average (e.g. a majority may correctly think that
‘stealing’ is an act more characteristic of others than of themselves) as well as for dimensions allow
multiple interpretations (e.g. using their own definitions, a majority may accurately claim that they are
more moral than average).
than high-traceability, and conversely, that academically desirable actions would be
viewed as more likely under conditions of high-traceability rather than low-
traceability (hypothesis 2).
We were also interested in examining whether the positive and negative
superiority effects would be more pronounced if the academic appropriateness of
desirable and undesirable actions is expected to be unverifiable by others within
the field (low-traceability rather than high-traceability). Would social
psychologists think that especially others, not we ourselves, might be tempted
to engage in less desirable actions if the appropriateness of such actions is
believed to be low on traceability? This may be so, particularly if undesirable
(desirable) actions are considered to be even more undesirable (desirable) when
such actions are not very traceable (cf. Alicke, 1985). For example, bad behaviour
may be considered even ‘more bad’ when individuals act upon the belief that such
behaviour is unlikely to be noticed or recognized by others. Thus, we explored
whether the superiority effects predicted in hypothesis 1 would be more
pronounced for actions perceived as low traceable rather than for those
perceived as highly traceable (hypothesis 3).
Finally, we explored the role of academic position, whether participants are
faculty members or graduate students. These two groups differ in level of research
experience (i.e. conducting, publishing, and reviewing research) and may to some
extent differ in familiarity with the topics examined; these groups may also differ in
terms of their commitment to science. Thus, it is interesting to explore whether the
predicted superiority effects or influences of traceability will be moderated by
academic position.
METHOD
Participants and Experimental Design
Participants of this study were recruited at a conference organized by the Dutch
Association of Social Psychological Researchers. At the 1994 conference held at
Groningen, we distributed 120 questionnaires which took about 10 minutes to
complete. Participants could complete the questionnaire either during the conference
(and drop it in a designated box), or after the conference (and mail it to the Free
University). Three weeks after the conference, a total of 57 questionnaires had been
returned, yielding a 47.5 per cent response rate. The sample consisted of 30 men and
27 women; 52 worked at psychology departments at universities, and five worked at
other university departments. Eight participants were associate or full professors, 17
were assistant professors or post-doctoral researchers, and 32 were graduate students
(27 were working on their dissertations, and five were working on their master’s
theses). On average, participants were 33 years old, had 6.5 years of research
experience, and had published a total of 14.07 papers.
The study involved three within-participant variables and three between-
participants variables. The three within-participant variables were Desirability of
Action (desirable versus undesirable), Target of Judgement (self versus others), and
Type of Scenario (to be discussed shortly). The between-participants variables
678 P. A. M. Van Lange, T. W. Taris and R. Vonk
Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 27: 675–685 (1997) #1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
included Traceability, the perceived probability that others within the field would
verify the appropriateness of an action (high versus low traceability), Academic
Position (faculty members versus graduate students) and Order ( judgements of self
preceded judgements of others versus the reversed order). The primary dependent
variable involved probability judgements, asking how likely participants themselves
or the average Dutch social or organizational psychologist2 would be to engage in a
particular action, were they facing a comparable situation.
Procedure
Each participant completed a seven-page questionnaire. The first page described the
‘Complexity Scenario’ which, in the low-traceability condition, read:
You are analysing the data of your research and observe that virtually all hypotheses are
supported. Additional analyses, however, reveal that these results are actually quite
complex, in that they appear to be dependent on other factors (e.g. the order in which the
questions were asked, the experimenter’s gender). You are not particularly interested in
these effects and you find them hard to explain. You also think that it will be quite difficult
to publish a paper in which you discuss these complex effects. While these effects may be
found to be theoretically interesting in your area of research, it is uncommon to pay
attention to these effects. Accordingly, were you to decide not to discuss these effects, the
odds that other readers (and reviewers) will notice this are negligibly small.
In the high-traceability condition, the last two sentences were replaced with: ‘Because
these effects are found to be theoretically interesting in your area of research, it is
quite common to pay attention to these effects. Accordingly, were you to decide not
to discuss these effects, the odds that other readers (and reviewers) will notice this are
fairly high’.
On the second page, the following two actions were rated. The undesirable action
read as follows: ‘You decide not to discuss these complex effects in the paper, and to
submit this paper for publication’. The desirable action read as follows: ‘You decide
to discuss these complex effects in the paper after spending some time on interpreting
these effects (e.g. through literature research), and then to submit this paper for
publication’. The two actions were rated for desirability, traceability, and the
probability of self and others to engage in these actions. These ratings will be
described shortly.
The third page described the ‘Copying Scenario’ which, in the low-traceability
condition, read:
You are writing a paper and notice in an article outside of your professional discipline two
paragraphs that perfectly state what you want to say. These are exactly the two paragraphs
you need to make your point in a sophisticated manner. Because these two paragraphs are
coming from another discipline, the odds that others will identify these paragraphs are
negligibly small. Your paper would improve substantially if you were to copy these
paragraphs.
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2In the instructions, we operationalized ‘others’ in terms of ‘social and organization psychologists’ because
the ASPO conferences also tend to be attended by a few psychologists working in areas which seem more
closely linked to organizational psychology.
In the high-traceability condition, the third sentence was replaced with: ‘Because
these two paragraphs are coming from the same area of research, the odds that
others will identify these paragraphs are fairly high’.
On the fourth page, the two following actions were rated. The undesirable action
read: ‘Apart from some minor exceptions you copy these paragraphs quite literally,
and at the end you cite the source in very global terms (i.e. the paragraphs will not be
read as a quotation or as an important reference). The desirable action read: ‘You
spend quite some time on paraphrasing these paragraphs in your own words, and cite
the source fairly explicitly (i.e. the citation will be read as a very important reference)’.
The last page of the questionnaire asked participants to report their age, gender,
position and department at the university, research experience, number of
publications, and whether they considered themselves as ‘basic’ or ‘applied’
researchers. Participants were debriefed in a newsletter of the Dutch Association
of Social Psychological Researchers.
Ratings
The undesirable and desirable actions for solving the ‘dilemmas’ in the scenarios
were rated for desirability (1=very undesirable; 9=very desirable) and traceability
(1=this decision cannot easily be checked by readers; 9=this decision can easily be
checked by readers). Moreover, we measured participants’ judgements regarding the
probability that self and others would engage in desirable and undesirable actions.
Specifically, we asked ‘How likely do you think you (the average Dutch social or
organizational psychologists) would make this decision, were you (they) faced with a
comparable situation?’ Ratings were made using nine-point scales (1=very unlikely;
9=very likely), and we systematically manipulated the order in which these
judgements for self and others were made. Finally, we should note that in the
analyses reported below the N varies from 54 to 56 for several dependent variables
due to occasional missing values.
RESULTS
Ratings of Desirability and Traceability: Manipulation Checks
Ratings of desirability were analysed in a five-factor ANOVA, with desirability of
action and scenario being within-participant factors and traceability of action,
academic position, and order being between-participants factors3. This analysis
revealed a main effect of desirability, F(1,48)=464.47, p50.001, indicating that
desirable actions (M=7.59 (S.D.=1.01) were perceived as more desirable than
undesirable actions (M=2.92, S.D.=1.07). No further effects were significant.
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3Ratings of desirability and traceability were analysed in separate five-factor analyses of variance, and
probability judgements were analysed in a six-factor analysis of variance (the results of which will be
discussed shortly). In light of the large number of analyses, and given the fact that these analyses allow for
a large number of tests (e.g. the six-factor ANOVA allows for a total of 63 tests), we used a p50.01 in
assessing the statistical reliability of the factors for which we had advanced no a priori hypotheses (i.e. the
effects involving type of scenario, academic position, and order).
Ratings of traceability were analysed in an identical ANOVA. This analysis
revealed a strong main effect for traceability, F(1,46)=32.21, p50.001, indicating
that actions in the low-traceable condition (M=4.74, S.D.=1.14) were perceived
as less traceable than those in the high-traceable condition (M=6.64, S.D.=1.04).
We also obtained a strong main effect for desirability, F(1,46)=44.52, p50.001,
indicating that undesirable actions (M=5.06; S.D.=1.91) were perceived as less
traceable than desirable actions (M=6.68; S.D.=1.61). Finally, an interaction of
traceability and desirability, F(1,46)=12.67, p50.001, revealed that the influence
of traceability was more pronounced for undesirable actions (Ms are 3.34
(S.D.=1.38) and 6.23 (S.D.=1.18), a mean difference of 2.89) than for desirable
actions (Ms are 6.14 (S.D.=1.58) and 7.05 (S.D.=1.55), a mean difference of
0.91), although this latter difference was still found to be significant,
F(1,52)=4.43, p50.05. This latter effect suggests that traceability is more
relevant for actions that violate some norm or expectation (i.e. undesirable
actions) than for actions that would seem to be more consistent with pre-existing
norms and expectations (i.e. desirable actions). Further results relevant to
traceability will be considered in light of this effect.
Probability Judgements for Self and Other Social Psychologist
Judgements regarding the probability of self and others to engage in particular
actions were analysed in a six-factor ANOVA, with desirability, type of scenario,
and target (self versus others) being within-participant factors, and traceability,
academic position, and order being between-participants factors. This analysis
revealed a strong interaction of target and desirability, F(1,48)=32.12, p50.001,
yielding a pattern which is consistent with hypothesis 1 (see Figure 1). Subsequent
simple effects revealed that for desirable actions, probability judgements for self
(M=6.46, S.D.=1.55) were greater than for others (M=5.74, S.D.=1.41;
F(1,55)=20.83, p50.001); conversely, for undesirable actions, probability
judgements for self (M=3.54, S.D.=1.33) were smaller than for others (M=4.42,
S.D.=1.46; F(1,55)=43.97, p50.001).
Consistent with hypothesis 2, the analysis revealed an interaction of traceability
and desirability, F(1,48)=6.39, p50.05. The means and standard deviations relevant
to this interaction are presented in Table 1. Simple effects indicated that undesirable
actions were judged to be more probable when they are perceived as low traceable
rather than highly traceable, F(1,54)=7.41, p50.01. Although the means were in the
expected direction, simple effects revealed that probability judgements of desirable
actions were not significantly greater in the high-traceability condition than in the
low-traceability condition, F(1,54)=1.13, n.s. The absence of this latter effect may be
due to the fact that the manipulation of traceability appeared to be more powerful
for undesirable actions than for desirable actions.
Relevant to hypothesis 2, the analysis revealed a three-way interaction of
traceability, desirability, and academic position, F(1,48)=7.36, p50.01, indicating
that the observed interaction in support of hypothesis 2 was reliable for faculty
members but not for graduate students (see Table 1). Specifically, simple effects
revealed that faculty members believed that (a) undesirable actions were more
probable when such actions are perceived as low traceable rather than highly
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traceable, F(1,23)=6.46, p50.02, and (b) desirable actions were less probable when
such actions are perceived as low traceable rather than highly traceable,
F(1,23)=8.11, p50.01. Among graduate students, however, there was no
significant effect of traceability on probability judgements of either undesirable
actions, F(1,31)=1.28, n.s., or desirable actions, F(1,31)=0.90, n.s.
We failed to find support for hypothesis 3. The absence of a significant interaction
of traceability, desirability, and target, F(1,48)=0.10, n.s., indicates that the
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Table 1. Mean probability judgements and standard deviations (within parentheses) as a
function of desirability, traceability, and academic position
Desirability Low High
Traceability Low High Low High
Academic position
Graduate students 4.14a 3.60a 6.41b 5.94b
(1.02) (1.40) (1.06) (1.54)
Faculty 4.81b 3.59a 5.42c 6.89d
(1.23) (1.09) (1.49) (0.89)
Means 4.50b 3.59a 5.88c 6.27c
(1.17) (1.28) (1.38) (1.35)
Note. Significant differences within rows are indicated by different subscripts, p50.05.
Figure 1. Probability judgements for self and others to engage in desirable and undesirable
academic practices
superiority effects were not moderated by low versus high traceability. The only
other significant effect was an interaction of desirability and scenario,
F(1,48)=17.42, p50.001, revealing that the desirable (M=5.77, S.D.=1.76) and
undesirable actions (M=4.69, S.D.=2.00) in the complexity scenario elicited smaller
differences (i.e. a mean difference of 1.08) in probability judgements than those in the
copying scenario (respectiveMs are 6.43 (S.D.=1.80) and 3.28 (S.D.=1.67), a mean
difference of 3.15). It is possible that participants believe that they and others are
more likely to conceal complex effects than to mimic others’ sentences without
acknowledgement because (a) the former action might be to some extent motivated
or rationalized by the idea that such effects do not tend to be theoretically important
(for details, see scenario instructions) and/or (b) the latter action reflects a form of
plagiarism, and thus may be judged as highly unacceptable and therefore less
probable. Finally, not surprisingly, we observed a main effect for desirability,
F(1,48)=62.17, p50.001, indicating that undesirable actions (M=3.98, S.D.=1.30)
were rated as less probable overall than desirable actions (M=6.10, S.D.=1.36).
DISCUSSION
The present findings provide good evidence in support of positive and negative
superiority among social psychologists, thinking that they are more likely than
others to engage in desirable actions and less likely than others to engage in
undesirable actions when faced with dilemmas of academic practice. This evidence
supports hypothesis 1 and indicates that self-enhancing tendencies exist among
individuals who presumably are aware of superiority effects (and to some extent have
informed others about such effects), thereby contributing to the generality of self–
other beliefs which have been described as illusory or biased. The current findings
are mute as to the specific mechanisms that account for the superiority effects, and
whether these superiority effects stem from ‘biased’ perceptions of the self, others, or
both. However, given that participants believed that others are at least somewhat
likely to engage in academically undesirable actions, two mechanisms would seem
especially important. First, participants may have intentionally brought to mind a
subset of scientists that is relatively likely to engage in academically undesirable
actions (cf. downward comparison; Wills, 1991). Second, such a selective focus on
others that are somewhat inferior to self may also occur in a relatively unintentional
manner. For example, thinking about academically undesirable actions may elicit
images or stereotypes of some social psychologists (real or imaginary) that are more
negative than positive (cf. stereotype salience; Weinstein, 1980; see also Van Lange &
Rusbult, 1995).
A second major finding was that social psychologists believed that undesirable
actions are more likely—and desirable actions somewhat less likely— if the odds
that others will verify the appropriateness of these actions are believed to be low
rather than high (i.e. evidence in support of hypothesis 2). This pattern, however,
was only observed among faculty members and not among graduate students.
Faculty members differ in a number of ways from graduate students, yet one
important difference seems to be the amount of experience the two groups have
with conducting and publishing research. One interpretation would be based on the
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notion that due to their greater level of experience (conducting research as well as
publishing and reviewing research), faculty members may have acquired more
evidence suggesting that authors actually do at times engage in slightly biased
presentation styles. Moreover, given the tendency for individuals to assign greater
weight and attention to specific information that is negative rather than positive (cf.
Skowronski & Carlston, 1989), it is understandable that individuals with greater
experience are more likely to form an impression that the field engages in ‘slightly
biased presentation styles as long as it cannot be verified’. A second interpretation
gleans from the idea that, relative to graduate students, faculty members may be
more strongly committed to certain models or theories, and therefore tend to assign
greater importance to the theoretical idea itself than to the ‘subtleties’ suggested by
the data or procedures. This explanation is particularly relevant to accounting for
the effects observed for the complexity scenario.
Finally, the current research revealed no evidence in support of hypothesis 3,
predicting that superiority effects would be more pronounced if the odds that others
would verify the appropriateness of desirable and undesirable actions are believed to
be low. In retrospect, this may not be surprising because undesirable (and desirable)
actions were not rated as more undesirable (or more desirable) when the odds that
others will be able to verify or notice such actions are low rather than high.
Implications, Strengths, and Limitations
We wish to briefly outline some limitations and issues for future research. One
limitation derives from the fact that (a) we have used only two scenarios describing
specific dilemmas of academic practice, and that (b) only two actions—desirable
and undesirable actions—were rated in terms of probability. In reality, individuals
may encounter a more varied set of dilemmas and may consider various alternatives,
evaluatively less extreme actions that were not included in this study (e.g. in the
complexity scenario, one may decide to briefly report complex effects in footnotes).
A second limitation is that our sample may have been coloured by a selection bias.
Indeed, we cannot exclude the possibility that scientists who tend to engage in
desirable academic practices are more likely to participate in surveys relevant to the
subject matter of the experiment, than those who might not exclusively engage in
desirable practices.
One strength of the current research is that the beliefs relevant to dilemmas of
academic practice is a rather novel and interesting topic for future research (cf. Kerr,
1995). Many textbooks on research methods include a section on communication of
research and ethics (e.g. Judd, Smith, & Kidder, 1991), describing accuracy,
replicability, and novelty as important criteria for reporting research. Yet very little
is known as to how dilemmas of academic practice are perceived, which practices are
believed to be common or how scientists evaluate their own actions in relation to
those of others within the field. We wish to close by outlining that the current
findings— the superiority effects, in particular—are of potential relevance to
understanding how the peer-review process might work within social psychology and
related fields. For example, in writing papers, people may to some extent think that
others take a ‘benefit-of-the-doubt’ approach in their evaluations of some
ambiguities in the paper (e.g. incomplete information regarding procedure or
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analyses), thinking that others would take these for granted. However, in our roles of
reviewer (or reader), we might be more likely to take a somewhat more critical
approach, assuming that others tend to engage in rosy—yet slightly biased—
presentation styles. Thus, one implication of these superiority effects could be that
‘we-as-authors’ might be disturbed about some detailed questions and doubts
expressed by reviewers, whereas ‘we-as-reviewers’ might be convinced that such
questions and doubts are appropriate and useful in light of the accuracy,
replicability, and novelty of the contribution.
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